Life Lines, Life Connections and Biographical Traces/Forms by Roberts, Brian
 119
11 Life Lines, Life Connections 
and Biographical Traces/Forms 
  BRIAN ROBERTS 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article examines how we connect the myriad of events and feelings we 
experience - to render our lives meaningful. We imbue are experiences with 
meaning through relating time tenses, such as the past to the present, and 
attempt render ‘life’ comprehensible, ordered and continuous. The lines of life 
that are formed, using a variety of life connections, are not necessarily 
according to a strict chronology. They may twist and turn within our 
conceptions of time and be reinterpreted as we record, retrieve, rehearse and 
relive the past, present and future. The article argues that the ideas of 
motivation and fantasy need to be addressed more fully within narrative and 
other biographical analysis by apply notions of traces and forms and, further, 
that the ‘biographical’ itself is being radically transformed. The article consists 
of a number of exploratory notes and speculations rather than following a 
conventional format. 
 
Yet the celebrity is usually nothing greater than a more-publicized version of us. 
In imitating him (sic), in trying to dress like him, talk like him, look like him, 
think like him, we are simply imitating ourselves … (Boorstin, 1963: 83) 
 
Nor can one say with confidence that any popular hero, however ludicrous - say, 
the hippie - will not be the progenitor of a new way of life  (Klapp, 1969: 255) 
 
 
Narrative and the Human Perspective (1) 
 
We search for meaning in life and a ways of representing life in many ways – 
through poetry and dance, stories and gossip, painting and other visual media 
(see Finnegan, 2002). The unceasing quest is to give an understanding and 
form to experience, to locate us in place and time, to situate ourselves in webs 
of relations. In the endeavour to specify our connections, to delineate our 
boundaries of self and others, to think, ruminate and feel we are living and 
expressing a humanity: we seek not merely to understand the passing life, but 
to transcend the mundane and profane. 
 
Man’s (sic) individual and collective life has a spiritual reality, which is 
represented and explained to him through myths, folktales, folksongs, fables, 
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dreams, lyrical ballads, epics, parables, epilogues, allegories, and many other 
literary and artistic forms. These forms have emerged as an explanation of man’s 
spiritual world, his personal world, in terms that make it comprehensible and 
meaningful to him. They derive from man’s universal need to explain such matters 
as the origin of the world, the all-too-evident existence of pain and suffering, the 
reality of what he defines as good and evil, and his relation to the power or powers 
beyond himself. These matters, which have concerned man in every society in 
history, are felt and are answered in symbolic terms which are personal in nature. 
  (Bryun, 1966: 142-3) 
 
 The stories we tell, the dances and songs we perform, and visual 
expressions and all the multiple interpersonal links with others in sociality are 
essentially auto/biographical. The evolving statements of self, the flowing 
understandings of others, are part of the inextricable elements composing ‘life 
lines’ which attempt cohesion, unity and order. Writers using a narrative 
analysis of stories/plot in told lives have sought to uncover these processes. 
But, in such work often there are the lingering restraints imposed by post-
structuralist imperatives: the centrality of the text, the reduction to linguistic or 
rhetorical schemas, the tendency to reduce ‘real people’ to mere mediators, 
rather than the constructors of ‘narrative’. Analysis may become formulaic due 
to the fear of an intruding ‘personal’ and a ‘realist’ orientation; while forgetting 
the reality of the analyst as narrator: the individual becomes a ‘paper being’ (as 
declares Barthes) in narrative. However, it is not necessary to say that to 
recognise a ‘human perspective’ means the re-instatement and re-insertion of 
some unitary, omnipresent figure: the author as a ‘full subject and the narrative 
the instrumental expression of that fullness’- as if narrative then becomes mere 
representation of individual as author and ‘reality’ (Sontag, 1983: 283). Hence, 
Barthes’s view that ‘Structural analysis is unwilling to accept such an 
assumption: who speaks (in the narrative) is not who writes (in real life) and 
who writes is now who is’ is a premature announcement of the ‘death of the 
author’ (Sontag, 1983: 283). But, there is no need for rigid and divisive 
conceptions of the personal, authorship and subject when applied to life 
accounts - they are separable and yet interconnected. I am a person, an author, 
a subject (and as object of the account), and also the reader/audience of my 
own life account and others. 
 
 
Freedom and Time 
 
Ruin hath taught me thus to ruminate:  
That Time will come and take my love away, 
This thought is as a death, which cannot choose 
But weep to have that which it fears to lose. 
  (William Shakespeare, Sonnet 64: 11-14 in Alexander, 1951; Coveney and 
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  Highfield, 1991: 23) 
 
 We live according to meanings within our intersubjective world - but we 
also are in a continuous search for deeper meanings or realities - a freedom 
which we assume will come from greater self-knowledge, the revelation of a 
hidden basis for existence, or some unfolding secret through which we will 
find stability, peace and harmony. Yet, such a programme for establishing 
‘true’ or fundamental meanings is itself a constraint: an attempt to essentialize, 
rigidify, and predict - in the end to defeat meaning: a ‘freedom’ from the 
tyranny of representation which will only render freedom restricted or itself 
devoid of recognition. The individual ‘seeker’ becomes the ‘lost’ as the pursuit 
of freedom is devalued as against the next ‘realisation’, as gratification replaces 
development, and ‘freedom’ becomes itself a fetishized object or measured 
objective In all this, the sense of time takes on a new aspect. The seeker is 
caught between the unsatisfactory immediacy of gratification, as supported by 
the commodification of time and ‘freedom’ and some far-off unrepressed 
existence. The unrealisable attainment of ‘essential’ self-insight and life-
meaning become intensified into a disabling unease as the future tenses of time 
lengthen and blur. The answers become more outside the grasp, disappointment 
the increasing probability. The individual is left in the limbo between 
immediate solutions to self-doubts and the impossibility of complete self-
knowledge. 
 
Order is freedom only if it is founded on and sustained by the free gratification of 
the individuals. But the fatal enemy of lasting gratification is time, the inner 
finiteness, the brevity of all conditions. The idea of integral human liberation 
therefore necessarily contains the vision of the struggle against time’. 
  (Marcuse, 1969: 155) 
 
 We exist in the implications of a fundamental paradox: the pursuit of 
freedom can only be realised by order, continuity and coherence. We search for 
meaning and yet, eventually, this very act puts all meaning - even any 
definition of freedom in doubt. Although, aware of our own finiteness we seek 
a transcendence which divorces us from the realities of daily existence and 
denies our inevitable ending. The result is disenchantment with daily existence, 
as any project for freedom cannot equate with possible life lines. 
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Time, Narrative and Dialectic 
 
Our knowledge of daily life is not without hypotheses, inductions and predictions, 
but they all have the character of the approximate and the typical … Anticipations 
of future states of affairs are conjectures about what is to be hoped or feared, or at 
best, abut what can be reasonably expected. (Schutz, 1972: 98) 
 
 Within the study of narrative the connection with time has been seen as 
especially important - as an inextricably bound within narrativisation. For 
Ricoeur, narrative has a basic feature - ‘the temporal dialectic’: the plot is the 
‘objective correlate of the act of following a story’ ‘events are made into story 
through plot’ (Ricoeur, 1981: 173).  
 But, ‘narrative time’ is only one - and a simple form - of biographical time, 
which rests on a particular model of life: chronology of ‘story’, a clear 
sequence of development. Although realising there is a greater complexity 
within specific narratives, narrative analysts need to take the fact that 
individuals re-sequence, leave gaps, emphasise some parts more, and ‘re-
collect’ memories, and differ in extent of ‘fictionalising’ or ‘storying’ life 
rather further (see Strawson, 2004). Jean Luc Goddard says somewhere in 
relation to film: ‘every film must have a beginning, middle and end but not 
necessarily in that order’ - so with ‘life itself’. Life experience has many ‘life 
lines’ and forms of connection - only some (or parts) generally equate to the 
story as self-edited by the giver (from previous stories, fragments of stories, 
half-forgotten, newly ‘remembered’ events), or as analysed by the biographical 
researcher or even as told to oneself or others at a particular time and place. 
 A ‘story’ is a changing narration - what has been storied is shaped at a 
particular time of creation; ‘storying’ is part of a broader endless process of 
storaging - connecting and memorising - as life proceeds. Thus to equate the 
act ‘narration’ (oral, written or in other forms) too narrowly with narrative as 
plot and story is to limit the range of human expression. It is to see us as 
‘storied selves’ - as composed merely of stories, and ultimately, as stories of 
the present moment, thus also narrowing the biographical perceptions of time. 
Narrative does play an important part, as Ricoeur argues, in establishing 
humanity ‘along with human actions and passions’ and, further, ‘brings us back 
from within-time-ness to historicality, from ‘reckoning with’ time to 
‘recollecting it’ (Ricoeur, 1981: 174). However, ‘plot’ and ‘story’ as analytical 
devices only go so far - not all experience is storied, stories change even within 
a given interview let alone from interview to interview, or diary to interview, 
written story to interview and so on; there are multiple, hidden stories, secret 
stories, and different versions of stories for different audiences and situations. 
Different genres and rhetorical conventions create different accounts of the 
same ‘story’. Crucially, attention must also be paid to how life connections are 
drawn. A more comprehensive way to understanding ‘accounting’ (in the 
various senses of the tem) is to see us as attempting coherence, continuity and 
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order to establish meaning by a complexity of life connections and lines. In a 
human perspective, a biographical understanding of the individual does not 
disappear into the schemas of story or language structure. Such a ‘humanistic’ 
view fully restores the following: emotion, motivation, the multiplicity of 
forms of sensual communication (see Finnegan, 2002), the perceptual shifts in 
time tenses between past, present and future, and the complex intertwining of 
life lines. 
 
 
Narrative, Alienation and Time 
 
Thought which is totally unscientific and even which contradicts experience may 
yet be entirely coherent in that there is a reciprocal dependence between its ideas. 
Thus I may instance the writings of medieval divines and political 
controversialists as examples of mystical thought which, far from being chaotic, 
suffers from a too rigid application of syllogistic rules. Also the thought of many 
insane persons (monomaniacs, paranoiacs) presents a perfectly organized system 
of interdependent ideas. (Evans-Pritchard, 1934, in Worsley, 1970: 204) 
 
 Narrative and time in life accounts must be considered existentially with 
attention to feeling and emotion, as innermost expressions of our being - to 
provide a humanistic perspective on individual biographies. For example, 
Adam, in also recognising the ‘multiple time dimensions of our lives’ points to 
the alienation of time produced by clock time. To de-alienate clock time we 
need to be aware of its machine made character (Adam, 1995: 54). She argues 
that if we relate to death to clock time we take away the ‘essentially human 
understanding of that event; we dehumanise death’ (Adam, 1995: 54). 
Biographical understanding needs to retain the idea of time-openness, 
contingency and meaning re-creation: narrative analysis, certainly in a 
restrictive usage of story is at base a developmental, chronological model - not 
that unlike notions of life course, life stages and life history. As Adam 
concludes, there 
 
As such, concern with the multiple time dimensions of our lives is no mere 
theoretical, academic exercise; rather, it is a strategy for living, For this purpose, 
temporal time, the symbol of life, needs to be allowed to take high visibility. 
Recognizing time running out as ou creation, temporal time as present-creating 
becoming, and both as fundamental to our lives enables us to review the mutual 
implication of time and health and gives us choice for action. 
  (Adam, 1995: 54; see also Adam, 1990: 127-33) 
 
 
Life Connections 
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Straightforward words 
seem paradoxical (Lao Tzu, 1963: 140) 
 
 Narrativists and others have commonly noted various orders of connection 
within lives. For example, in relation to life changes, especially where 
disruption occurs - epiphanies, moments, conversion, episode (see Denzin, 
1989) - notions having roots in traditional religious or other thought and 
practice. Another connection is by the use of metaphor to describe a life as a 
whole - as journey, flow of a river (using rhetorical forms), or as a tragedy, 
romance, etc. (drawing upon literary and dramatic forms). Finally, at the level 
of academic interpretation - the life as a whole seen as a ‘course’ (cf. 
road/river), a ‘history’ (as in the stages of life in natural history), or cycle 
(again from natural history), plan (perhaps from military or planning), account 
(as in accountancy), and so on. The exploration of life connections reveal a 
more detailed way in which the basic elements of experience, as given in the 
told life, are related. They are employed by individuals in their attempts to give 
continuity, coherence and order - to give a humanity - a least the semblance of 
will and social competence. 
 The story and plot or any life account depends upon rhetoric (eg. 
metaphor, simile) and other features such as ‘turning points’ but detailed life 
connections as timed linkages between life’s elements have perhaps been 
neglected. Life connections can be of many kinds, from the perceptions of fate, 
coincidence, choice, determination of circumstance, chance, destiny, fate, 
karma, luck, providence, fortune, accident, kismet, design. In making 
connections we the link one experience-event to another diachronically or 
synchronically to lay the basis of an ‘understanding’ of our lives. 
 Types of Life Connections include: 
 
Coincidence - the coming together of events which seemingly are not formally 
related. 
 
Contingency refers to chance occurrence, one event dependent on some other 
incidental happening, accidental, conditionality, according to certain conditions 
(Fowler and Fowler, 1964: 264). 
 
Deja-vu - a feeling of return, a curious awareness of having experienced 
similar circumstances previously (see Cohen and Taylor, 1978: 47-8). 
 
Fate ‘Power predetermining events unalterably from eternity … of destiny, 
what is destined to happened; appointed lot of person, person’s ultimate 
condition’ (Fowler and Fowler, 1964: 440; see Goffman, 1967: 161-170; 
Miller, 1958). 
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Fortune - luck, chance upon, to seek better fortune, to fall in fortune - to be 
fortunate/unfortunate. 
 
Preordained - pregiven, current circumstances predetermined. 
 
Repetition is a recognition of how we ascribe the return of experience, events 
and feelings but to avoid paralysis and fragmentation and create a ‘viable self’) 
it must become recurrence as re-evaluated in current consciousness (see Cohen 
and Taylor, 1978, ch. 3; Frank, 1984; Roberts, 2003: 17). 
 
Serendipity is the propensity for accidental or unexpected discoveries. 
 
All of these life connections (and others) form the intricacies of the myriad life 
lines, which compose the ‘life’. When found in a life line some indicate a more 
active shaping of the life by the individual, others more governed by 
circumstance, as apparent when joined with rhetorical elements such as 
metaphor, simile and metonymy: ie. ‘my life has been a ‘journey’; ‘river’, etc. 
 
 
Motives and Life Connections 
 
In fact, an oral culture has no experience of a lengthy, epic-size or novel-size 
climactic linear plot. It cannot organize even shorter narrative in the studious, 
relentless climactic way that readers of literature for the past 200 years have 
learned more and more to expect - and, in recent decades, self-consciously to 
depreciate. It hardly does justice to oral composition to describe it as varying from 
an organization it does not know, and cannot conceive of. (Ong, 2002: 140) 
 
 An important issue in narrative analysis arises from its foundation in 
structuralist origins. The focus on the structure, genres or forms of narratives, 
despite the intention of biographical researchers, tends towards the components 
of the story and plot rather than the experiences of the teller. What is denuded 
is the phenomenological or existential elements and gestalt in biographical 
meaning: questions of emotion, perceptions of time, and motive - the 
intersubjective life view formed in the making of life connections and life lines 
by individuals 
 Motives are important part of life accounts, and can be rather neglected in 
narrative or other analyses. At the simplest, motives are before or after 
justifications and rationalisations (see classic accounts of motive: as a 
‘grammar’, Burke, 1945; ‘techniques of neutralisation’, Matza, 1964; 
‘vocabularies’ Gerth and Mills, 1953, Mills, 1970; ‘in-order-to motives’ and 
‘because motives’ Schutz, 1972: 86-96; and ‘accounts’, Scott and Lyman 
1968).(2) Gerth and Mills’ idea of ‘vocabularies of motive’ is particularly 
suggestive for the study of biographical accounts. Instead of the usual approach 
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to conceptualising motives as arising from the psychological basis in the 
individual, they see motives as within interaction (Martindale, 1961: 373). 
 
Conceived in this way, motives are acceptable justifications for present, future, or 
past programs of conduct … When a person confesses or imputes motives, he (sic) 
is not usually trying to describe his social conduct, he is … usually trying to 
influence others. (Gerth and Mills quoted in Martindale, 1961: 373) 
 
 Gerth and Mills’ injunction that symbolic interactionism requires and 
adequate discussion of motivation can be extended to narrative and some other 
modes of biographical analysis. Vocabularies of motive for Gerth and Mills 
have an institutional history as circumstances alter. On the other hand, they 
argue that vocabularies of motive are related to various psychological levels. 
But, as Martindale argues, for Gerth and Mills vocabularies of motive are 
fundamentally ‘social strategies’ used by individuals to support an integration 
of action with others (Martindale, 1961: 373-4). For biographical research, the 
identification of motives individuals give for past, present and future action, as 
part of life connections and life lines, are very important for our understanding 
lives. 
 Mills in his discussion of ‘Situated actions and vocabularies of motive’ 
argues that motives: ‘actually used in justifying or criticising an act definitely 
link it to situations, integrate one man’s action with another’s, and line up 
conduct with norms’. He adds that ‘typical vocabularies of motives for 
different situations are significant determinants of conduct’; ‘motives orient 
actions by enabling discrimination between their objects’ for instance, 
adjectives ‘such as “good”, “pleasant”, and “bad” promote action or deter it’. 
We influence others by naming acts or imputing motives while, at the same 
time ‘working vocabularies of motive have careers that are woven through 
changing institutional fabrics” (Mills, 1970: 475-6). Mills argues against the 
view that ‘motives are in some way biological’ as ‘real motives’ below ‘mere 
rationalization’. Also, he questions the phrase ‘unconscious motive’ since it 
supported ‘by persistence of the unnecessary and unsubstantiated notion that 
“all action has a motive”’ and by seeing ‘gaps in the relatively frequent 
verbalization in everyday situations’. Importantly, Mills says instead that 
motives are not always explicitly articulated and that all actions do not pivot 
around language’ - or we might add, story and plot in narrative analysis (Mills, 
1970: 476-7). 
 Following, Thomas and Znaniecki (1958) we should examine life accounts 
according to the beliefs and attitudes expressed, and the development of 
attitudes and values that people form as ‘lines of genesis’ - or, as here, as life 
connections and lines (Madge, 1970: 78-80; Martindale, 1961: 350-1; Roberts, 
2002: 42-5). 
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Life Connections and Motives - Case Study: Fantasy 
 
Fact or fantasy, the image becomes the thing. Its very purpose is to overshadow 
reality. American life becomes a showcase for images. For frozen pseudo-events. 
  (Boorstin, 1963: 201) 
 
Only by considering the act as accomplished can we judge whether the 
contemplated means of bringing it about are appropriate or not, or whether the end 
to be realised accommodates to the plan of our life. (Schutz, 1972: 12-13) 
 
The world of fantasies has a vocabulary and grammar as certainly as the world of 
material objects and events. (Cohen and Taylor, 1978: 77) 
 
 How life connections and motives operate in living can be usefully 
explored by considering the part played by ‘fantasy’ in shaping action and 
recollection. Here fantasy is not fancy or whimsy - but an essential part of 
being and action. for instance as ‘thinking in the future perfect tense’: 
 
Men stop and think only when the sequence of doing is interrupted, and the 
disjunction in the form of a problem forces them to stop and rehearse alternative 
ways - over, around or through - which their past experience in collision with this 
problem suggest. The image of a dramatic rehearsal of future action … we cannot 
find out which alternatives will lead to the desired end without imagining this act 
as already accomplished. So we have to place ourselves mentally in a future state 
of affairs which we consider as already realised …. I like to call this technique of 
deliberation ‘thinking in the future perfect tense’ … Like all other anticipations, 
the rehearsed future action also has gaps which only the performance of the act 
will fill in. Therefore the actor will only retrospectively see whether his project 
has stood the test or proved a failure. (Schutz, 1972: 102-3) 
 
 Therefore, fantasy is not merely about some unrealisable future goal, or 
what may happen but is also linked to the present and past - what can be, what 
could have been. Rather, as Laing argues, it is ‘a mode of experience’ which is 
‘essential part of the meaning or sense … implicit in action’ (Laing, 1971: 2-3). 
 We can provisionally identify three types of fantasy: as mundane, 
hypnotic, and as spectacle or demonstrating three aspects, in turn, the trivial, 
the romantic, the voyeuristic. 
 
Fantasy as Mundane 
 
Following Laing, if fantasy is a ‘mode of experience’ and part of the essential 
meaning of action - it is a routine part of relations with the world, it is a 
‘ubiquitous’ and ‘salient feature of everyday life’ (see Cohen and Taylor, 1978: 
71). Something of fantasy as ‘mundane’ can be seen in our interest in the 
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triviality contained in written works - a concern that we can say is found in 
other aspects of daily living. As Barthes asks: 
 
Why do some people, including myself, enjoy in certain novels, biographies, and 
historical works the representation of the ‘daily life’ of an epoch, of a character? 
Why this curiosity about petty details: schedules, habits, meals, lodging, clothing, 
etc.? Is it the hallucinatory relish of ‘reality’ (the very materiality of ‘that once 
existed’)? And it is not the fantasy itself which invokes the ‘detail,’ the tiny 
private scene, in which I can easily take my place? Are there, in short, ‘minor 
hysterics’ (these very readers) who receive bliss from a singular theater: not one of 
grandeur but one of mediocrity (might there not be dreams, fantasies of 
mediocrity)? 
  (Sontag, 1983: 408) 
 
Fantasy as Hypnosis 
 
Many ordinary circumstances, despite what be often perceived, can be declared 
alluring, beguiling, engrossing, sublime or transcendent. An ordinary event, a 
person, emotion or thought may have a kind of ‘fantasy’. For example ‘love’ 
while ubiquitous in thought and discussion, as a pervasive subject in both 
‘popular’ and ‘higher’ arts, is a relatively neglected topic for academic 
concern. - and is a part of fantasy. In Barthes’ interesting discussion of love as 
a hypnosis - he describes love at first sight as being ‘stunned’, ‘shaken’ 
‘paralyzed’ fascination by and image and then ‘held fast, immobilized, nose 
stuck to the image (the mirror)’ (Sontag, 1983: 434-8; cf. Sartre, in Danto, 
1975; 121-3). It is ‘distinct, abrupt, framed, it is already (again, always) a 
memory …’. In this sense then, fantasy as hypnosis provides a pause and a 
framing - which like the photograph ‘is not to represent but to memoralize’ 
(Sontag, 1983: 439), and yet, as O’Malley argues, there is in love an 
‘actualization of emotivity - the motivating of intentionality - brought to the 
pitch of its effective awareness’. For, as he adds, ‘the being of man (sic) is 
radically a promise to be ratified by him in its achieving’ (O’Malley, 1972: 
103). 
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Fantasy as Celebrity 
 
Fantasy as celebrity is the quest for realisation - to identify with a ‘famed’ 
Other, even to become (if only by imitation) the idealisation that we conspire 
to project (see Klapp, 1969). But, 
 
Wherever we turn we see the mirror, and in it (though we like to pretend we are 
seeing somebody else) we see ourselves … (Boorstin, 1963: 185) 
 
 The attempts to ‘debunk celebrities’ in popular magazines and elsewhere 
as unfit for our ‘admiration are like efforts to get ‘behind the scenes’ in the 
making of other pseudo-events. They are self-defeating. They increase our 
interest in the fabrication’ (Boorstin, 1963: 83-4). Further: 
 
The same quest for spontaneity helps to explain, too, our morbid interest in private 
lives, in personal gossip, and in the sexual indiscretions of public figures. In a 
world where the public acts of politicians and celebrities become more and more 
contrived, we look ever more eagerly for happenings not brought into being 
especially for our benefit. We search for those areas of life which may have 
remained immune to the cancer of pseudo-eventfulness. (Boorstin, 1963: 256) 
 
 Thus the search for fantasy outside experience has the opposite effect - the 
celebrity quest is increasingly becomes a circle of imagery and expectation 
which ultimately is both contrived by us as fantasy but resides in our own 
reflection. The quest for celebrity is a ‘voyage of identity’ that returns to our 
own port - although ‘largely compensatory and vicarious’ there is something 
almost heroic in the attempt (Klapp, 1969: 255). 
 
Once we abandon the Carlylean perspective [on the hero], the celebrities of today 
stop being merely disappointing and become interesting in a new way - as persons 
who become famous as beatniks, folk singers, hippies, playboys, playgirls, 
sexpots, good Joes, smart operators, charmers, personality kids, splendid 
performers, jacket boys, surfers, hipsters, pundits, mystics, dandies, characters, 
daredevils, rebels, super athletes, disk jockeys, and comedians - as experiments in 
identity, some pathetic, some brave. Like all fads, they are efforts to find an 
exciting and victorious way of living under modern conditions of bureaucracy, 
impersonality, and pushbutton comfort, which work so powerfully to defeat the 
heroic spirit. 
  (Klapp, 1969: 255) 
 
 Celebrities offer fantasy ‘life lines’ as possible or vicarious futures while 
they are also a reflection of our own condition and mirroring our own selves. 
We strive relentlessly for the ‘unexpected’ but ‘we end by finding the only the 
unexpectedness we planned for ourselves’ and meet ourselves ‘coming back’ 
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resulting in our experience becoming ‘invention rather than discovery’ (see 
Boorstin, 1963: 83-4). 
 
 
Biographical Traces/Forms and Biographical Reproduction 
 
Would it not be an eligible plan … to employ the Camera Obscura … to take a 
view of what is passing in the streets of the town and communicate the result, if 
necessary to the Police Office, or the Jail, by means of a telegraph … every thing 
would then take place, as it where, under the eye of the Police … if any 
impropriety or misconduct were observed it would only be necessary to send a 
posse to the particular spot … 
  (The Glasgow Mechanics Magazine, 1824, in Jennings, 1985: 164) 
 
Simulacrum … Image of something; shadowy likeness, deceptive substitute, mere 
pretence. (Fowler and Fowler, 1964: 1189) 
 
 Biographical reproduction, of course, has two original forms: via sexual 
reproduction the physical characteristics of the parents are passed on as part of 
a generational sequence, and by social transmission the cultural attitudes and 
values of the carers are carried (but not merely accepted) through socialisation, 
and by wider social orality (stories, myths). The ‘biographical’ was also later 
carried by portraiture, usually of the wealthy, and by the written word in 
writings on leaders, saints, philosophers and others, carrying the ‘trace’ (deeds, 
character, appearance) of the individual. The later invention of the camera and 
the moving image transformed the ‘mirror’ provided permanence and 
facilitated the reproduction of the image. In a comparable manner, the printing 
press had provided a record and endless replication of biographical actions, 
albeit not immune from mythologysing and addition. Eventually, the rise of the 
modern novel and biography created new genres for the representation of the 
life. 
 The past two centuries have brought a series of major changes in means 
and techniques of visual and other representation: from the portrait to the 
photograph, cine-film, tv, video and video phone, computer graphics and so on. 
These have brought many effects but as fundamental as any has been a shift in 
the relations of time - the uses of the tenses of past-present-future - as in the 
recording of present time for future time. These changes in representation not 
only provide new means of expression, as in the construction and replication of 
the biography, but also new means of internal and external biographical 
surveillance.(3) The origins of means of mechanical/optical surveillance 
obviously have a long history, the telescope being a prime example. It is 
sometimes overlooked that ideas and practices of surveillance we see as novel 
have a longer genesis, for example, CCTV is not a recent idea although newer 
technology is able to make it more feasible. The ‘surveillance society’ is not 
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new; for example, in modern times the compilation of statistics on the 
population and incarceration and observation of ‘problematic’ groups was part 
of the growth of the modern state in the late 18c and early 19c. The crucial 
shift today is the acceleration of scanning, recording and correlation - and 
hence, the increasing possibilities of intervention. 
 In the ‘scanning society’, biographical presences and profiles are skimmed, 
swiped and recorded in innumerable ways: for example, swipe cards, phone-
records, genealogical data; ID cards, licences, passports, brain and body scans, 
personal computer records, debt and credit records, CCTV, satellite location, 
and medical, education, police, court, tax, welfare, court, police, educational, 
and work records. More specifically, stem-cell research, egg and sperm-banks, 
DNA data and other biological advances are raising profound issues for 
biographical reproduction and identity. But, we are also becoming increasingly 
interested in our own biographical origins - as witnessed by the extraordinary 
growth of genealogical research, as on the internet, and gene inheritance as 
knowledge expands (see Cavalli-Sforza, 2001). Additionally, cosmetic surgery 
on body and face, the effects of diet and drugs are affecting the ‘reality’ and 
perceptions of the assumptions of the life course or stages. As lives lengthen 
‘youthfulness’ as merely a feature of youth becomes questioned and as our 
other assumptions regarding age-related behaviour. In short, what is emerging 
is the combination of external (place and time) and forensic-internal 
observation of individuals and groups: technological advances enable new 
means of recording the volume and the correlation of instances of biographical 
action and the biographical mapping of the mind and body. These ‘advances’ 
come at moment of biographical disruptions in the biological, occupational, 
familial-relational patterns of ‘life courses’ - new uncertainties concerning age-
behaviour, career, civil and sexual behaviour, competencies in the face of 
changing technology and health and longevity. 
 In the light of these uncertainties we seek guidance and are sold help in 
shaping our lives. The ‘biography business’ has grown into a massive 
economic sector - ‘to be able to live requires a manual and a video’ or so it 
seems - with any number of entrepreneurs, gurus and specialists willing to 
offer ‘recipes’ on living. Writers (ghost writers, columnists and biographers), 
style gurus (make-over specialists for clothes and looks), life coachers 
(organisers and advisors), physical health trainers (how to be fitter, stronger, 
younger) are there ready to change your life. Success formulators, career 
assessors, management technicians and the rest tell us how to achieve, win, and 
be confident, while for the less fortunate the victim/survivalist/literature - how 
to overcome abuse, poverty, serious illness - has become a literary genre. If 
you need to write your cv, have a job interview; lost the habit of dating and 
mating there are shelves of guidance just for you. In books, magazines and 
newspapers therapists and habit-busters (how to deal with your ‘personal 
problem’) are poised to help aided and abetted by cosmeticians prepared to 
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mask, insert, suction, refigure and reconstruct the face and body; and tv 
producers offering make-overs, life swops, rat-race escapes, fame and fortunes 
- served up for the vicarious enjoyment and experience of the many. 
 It is difficult not to surmise that the ‘biographical turn’ across the 
disciplines - following succession of other such ‘phases’, ‘moments’ 
(linguistic, cultural) and so on is really part of a grander socio-historical 
landscape (see Chamberlayne et al., 2000; Denzin, 2001; Denzin and Lincoln, 
2000). As has been frequently argued in post-modern or post-traditional 
discussion the disruption of traditional rituals and biographical paths has 
spurred the need to construct identity - or even several co-existing, interrelated, 
overlapping identities. On the one hand, these changes bring the possibility of 
new individual freedoms in making him/herself but, on the other, there is also a 
danger that an anomic condition arises where the guides to action become 
contradictory or cease to exist. The latter is constrained by the scanning and 
monitoring of individuals and groups by the State and other institutions 
coupled with the intense demand to self-monitor through the continuous 
evaluation our private and institutional lives (eg. through the cv, the 
‘professional development review’ with the ‘line manager’ and so on). The 
outcome is often a tension between our sense of the personal fulfilment and 
intended life line(s) and the prescribed career path for the employee (see 
Morgan and Mann, 1993; Fischer-Rosenthal, 2002). 
 Looking further ahead we can speculate that biological reproduction will 
be joined (if allowed) by other human or quasi-human biographical forms 
produced by assisted, artificial means of production and reproduction, for 
example: simulcra, cyborgs, androids, clones, holograms, the reshaped 
cosmetic bodies. The expectation of the rise of such forms give rise to fears: 
 
Cyborg … The term cyborg was first coined in 1960 by Manfred Clynes, a 
research space scientist. A combination of ‘cybernetic’ and ‘organism’, it is used 
to describe a hybrid being who is half-human, half-machine. Cyborgs have been a 
staple motif in science fiction since the 1920s … In its iconic role, therefore, the 
cyborg acts as a symbol of the fear that humanity itself is in danger of becoming 
entirely absorbed into a wholly technological future within which the machine 
becomes the paradigm by which the organic itself functions. (Sim, 1998: 219-20) 
 
 Perhaps at least there are some grounds for apprehension. Stem cells, 
plastic and organic body replacements, DNA mapping, gene research, open up 
new biographical avenues: increased longevity - not merely by the replacement 
of parts for the renewal of the body, or in its dramatic cosmetic reshaping of 
particular individuals but by a further step. New forms of ‘procreation’ and 
new ‘species’ - human-animal; human-mechanical; human-organic/plant - are 
becoming possible. These and even more complex combinations, if permitted, 
will incorporate new kinds of communication both within such beings and 
between beings. The modification and ‘upgrading’ of the senses (eg. by nano-
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sight/sound implants, infra-red connections and other means), the 
‘downloading’ of the brain (emotions, knowledge, projected actions, etc.) and 
linking with other forms of ‘intelligence’ (organic and molecular-atomic based 
intelligence systems raise new biographical issues. These developments will 
raise old biographical questions in intensified ways: ‘Who am I?’ and ‘Who are 
you?’ - and also, ‘What am I?’ Even, further brain and computer storage and 
retrieval (eg. as holograms, or brain transfer) and cloning (if permitted) will 
raise questions of ‘When am I?’ ‘Where am I?’ and ‘How am I?’. As The 
Frankfurt School argued (in 1956) the societal shifts in the construction of the 
individual have profound implications: 
 
And society, which produced the development of the individual, now is 
developing by alienating and fragmenting this individual. At the same time, the 
individual, for his part, misconstrues the world, on which he is dependent down to 
his innermost being, mistaking it for his own. 
  (The Frankfurt School of Social Research, 1974: 48) 
 
 
Epilogue - Biographical slums? 
 
The language of images, then, is not circumlocution after all. It is the only simple 
way of describing what dominates our experience. (Boorstin, 1963: 208) 
 
 In the late 1960s Gordon Rattray Taylor pointed to the possibility of 
biological slums unless the rapid development of biotechnology was closely 
regulated. He pointed to the results of the mechanical revolution of the 
eighteenth century and the resulting appalling social conditions of the slums, 
which have taken a great effort to replace by a civilised living. He pointed to 
the possibility of what we can call ‘biographical slums’: 
 
In some countries, no doubt, the state will decide who is to be promoted to the 
privileged class, and there may be degrees of privilege. Manual workers will have 
exoskeletons, athletes will have spare hearts, and computer programmers spare 
heads. Only the head of state will have all the advantages. Outstanding workers 
may be rewarded by a licence to acquire an additional prosthesis and laggards 
punished by removal and down-grading. In other countries, costly prosthetic 
devices may be leased, so that one can enjoy a wider range of experience for a 
time … These speculations should not be dismissed too quickly as merely fanciful. 
  (Taylor, 1969: 97) 
 This new bio-stratification is part of wider disruptions in life lines created 
by the lengthening of the life span (due to changing work patterns and 
conditions, educational expansion, shifts in social habits and diet, and 
improvements in health care). The ‘biographical’ is therefore facing a range of 
crucial reformations as its social construction, longevity and activities are 
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reshaped, and its appearance, organs and senses are renewed, replace and 
enhanced. Even its very form becomes diversified, possibly, into ‘new species’ 
which intermingling of organic, mechanical, informational, perceptual and 
sensual components and types of communication. For biographical research we 
need to place the ‘stories’ people provide in to this developing situation, place 
them in their contexts - as we all will need to strive to understand the world 
around us. In this view we will ‘need to move from life stories to life histories, 
from narratives to genealogies of context, towards a modality that embraces 
stories of action within theories of context’ (Goodson, 1995: 98). In this way, 
as Goodson argues, stories can be ‘‘located’, see as the social constructions 
they are, fully impregnated by their location within power structures and social 
milieu’ (Goodson, 1995: 98). As he implores: 
 
Only if we deal with stories as the starting point for collaboration, as the 
beginning of a process of coming to know, will we come to understand their 
meaning; to see them as social constructions which allow us to locate and 
interrogate the social world in which they are embedded. (Goodson, 1995: 98) 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. ‘The human perspective’ is taken from the title of Bruyn’s (1966) classic, 
but much neglected, text. 
 
2. Scott and Lyman’s (1968) well known discussion of motivation is also 
very insightful and could be further developed in biographical research. 
They describe an as a ‘statement made by a social actor to explain 
unanticipated or untoward behavior - whether that behavior is his (sic) own 
or that of others, and whether the proximate cause for the statement arises 
from the actor himself or someone else’. They give two types of accounts; 
excuses - socially approved vocabularies for mitigating or relieving 
responsibility when conduct is questioned (appeal to accidents, 
defeasibility, biological drives and scapegoating) and justifications - 
‘accounts in which one accepts responsibility for the act in question, but 
denies the pejorative quality associated with it justifications - (‘techniques 
of neutralisation’ from Sykes and Matza, 1957, see also Matza, 1964, ‘sad 
tales’ and ‘self-fulfilment’. They add also ‘strategies for avoiding 
accounts’ - some people are relatively invulnerable to questions regarding 
their conduct due to their authority, status and position - there are others 
which are strategies of avoidance - mystification, referral and identity-
switching’. Accounts they argue ‘presuppose an identifiable speaker and 
audience’ and ‘Every account is a manifestation of the underlying 
negotiation of identities’. Finally, they describe five ‘linguistic styles that 
frame the manner in which an account will be given and often indicate the 
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social circle in which it will be most appropriately employed’: intimate, 
casual, consultative, formal and frozen styles’. 
 
3. There is a very large literature on the ‘surveillance society’, see, for 
example: Norris and Armstrong, 2001; Lyon, 1994, Lyon ed., 2002; 
Whitaker, 2000. 
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